PAKISTAN ARMY CHIEF GENERAL KAYANI'S
EXTENSION: IMPLICATIONS
By Dr Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
Pakistan Army Chief, General Kayani has been the focus of intense media discussions in the last week or so. Rightly so, because in Pakistan’s long
history this is the first time that a civilian democratic government in name has granted an unprecedented three year extension to General Kayani in
continuation of his due date of retirement in November 2010. The last time such a development took place was the extension given to General Ayub
Khan by President Iskandar Mirza, but then he was not an elected head.
While speculation has been on for a few months that General Kayani may be granted a year’s extension, later followed by speculation that it may be a
two-year extension, but nobody was prepared for Pakistani Prime Minister’s curt three minute announcement that a three year extension has been given
to General Kayani.
Obviously strong pressures have come into play and the question is whether such pressures were Pakistani domestic pressures or were they external
pressures that came strongly into effect. Undoubtedly, enough has figured in the media that the United States had indicated to the Pakistani
Government that it would like General Kayani to continue at the helm of the Pakistan Army.
Normally, such a development would have been ignored as the internal matter of Pakistan, but then one remembers the reality that General Kayani is
the ‘de facto’ ruler of Pakistan today and that he is driving Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India and Afghanistan and therefore makes it a subject of
regional and international analysis.
The signals emanating from such a development become more ominous when it is borne in mind that the United States is increasingly be seemed in
a ‘permissive mode” to let General Kayani lead United States by the nose in policy formulations on Afghanistan and India.
India must perceive General Kayani as a strong politico-military challenge for its policy formulations on Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States. In
well-calculated and well -calibrated moves he has placed Pakistan as the ‘PIVOT’ on which United States policy formulations in respect of all these
countries should revolve. Militarily he has reinvented Pakistan Army’s strategic utility to the United States and in the process invented his own
indispensability to the United States prompting it to pressure the Pakistan Government for a three year extension.
The implications for India’s national security become more complex with General Kayani with his “India-Centric’ hatred of India publicly articulated. India
at the time of General Kayani’s appointment as Pak Army Chief in 2007 was misled by US-fed assessments that he was a professional soldier and
therefore not prone to military adventurism against India. Such was the reliance on these assessment that India’s then National Security Adviser went
public to give a certificate to General Kayani.
Contextually therefore, for the benefit of the Indian policy establishment more pointedly, it is imperative that the chaff of Western ‘spins’ on General
Kayani are dispensed to the wind and an effort be made to unmask the real General Kayani by a deeper analysis of his professional record. The impact
of General Kayanis’ three years extension on India’s foreign policy and national security is touched in this Paper too.
As far as Pakistan is concerned it has to grapple seriously as to what impact this extension to General Kayani has on the overall question of civil-military
relations in Pakistan and the repercussions in the Pakistan Army officer cadre.
In unmasking the real General Kayani, this Paper would prefer to briefly dwell on the following aspects;
• General Kayani’s Appointment as Pakistan Army Chief and His Present Extension has the “Made in America” Stamp All-over
• General Kayani: A Political Chameleon Rather Than A Professional Soldier
• Pakistan Army’s Military Operations under General Kayani in Frontier Regions were Basically Genocidal in Nature.
• General Kayani’s Linkages With Al Qaeda, Taliban and Islamic Jihadi Terrorist Organizations
• General Kayani’s Extension: Foreign Policy Implications for India
• General Kayani’s Extension: Military Implications for India
General Kayani’s Appointment as Pakistan Army Chief and His Present Extension has the “Made in America”: Stamp All-over
A marked feature of United States involvement in the Pakistani scheme of things has been that they have always cultivated potential Pakistani Army
Chiefs and also as an insurance a second rung of Pakistan Army Generals as insurance cover if the preferred protégé turns out otherwise. However
such processes were subtly put into effect.
In the case of General Kayani, a beleaguered General Musharraf was pushed by the United States to name his DG ISI as the next Army Chief in 2007.
He was the United States preferred choice as following his appointment a ‘spin campaign’ was put in overdrive to project General Kayani as a thorough
professional, apolitical and inclined to let democracy take roots in Pakistan.
So heavily has the United States invested in the person of General Kayani that in March 2010 in the first ever US-Pak Strategic Dialogue the United
States made no secret that General Kayani was the ‘American Man’ in Islamabad and that he would be calling all shots . Media coverage of that time
amply highlights how much the United States policy establishment fawned over him in Washington. Equally in Islamabad, visiting US political
dignitaries made it a point to call on the Army Chief and pay their respects.
General Kayanis’ extension under US pressure was therefore a foregone conclusion, with only the quantum of extension being a major surprise.
While the simplistic deduction that is surfacing is that the United States would have extracted assurances that the Pak Army would facilitate a safe exit
for US Forces from Afghanistan, there is more yet to surface in terms what the Pakistani media calls a ‘Pak Army-US Deal”.
The ‘Made In America” stamp on General Kayani carries many serious implications for the General, in a country where ‘Anti-Americanism’ is at an all
time high. Pakistan seems to be divided deeply on the announcement of the three-year extension to General Kayani.
The respected Pakistani newspaper, The DAWN, in an Editorial, July 24, 2010 remarked:
• “Like it or not, the extension does not reflect well on the Army as an institution. It is almost an article of faith that the Pakistan Army is the only viable,
strong and vibrant institution in the country.
• Whatever General Kayani’s intimate familiarity with the present state of affairs and whatever the unique understanding of his of the situation, a
strong institution should be able to withstand the retirement of one man, however experienced.
• It is difficult to reconcile the idea of a strong institution having depth in talent and leadership with the “indispensability of a single man”
The same Editorial further pointedly asks if the United States could remove General McChrystal from Afghanistan at a critical juncture, Pakistan too
could have let General Kayani to go into retirement. Many former Pak Army retired officers opined that General Kayani should have refused the extension
offer.
General Kayani: A Political Chameleon Rather Than a Professional Soldier
Reflected on a Pakistani website was this description of General Kayani that he was recognized as a political chameleon. It quotes his long line of
political involvements in his service commencing with being Deputy Military Secretary to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and ending up with as a protégé
of General Musharraf whose personal animosity towards Bhutto was well known.
Kayani was Musharraf’s envoy to discussions with Bhutto in Dubai on power sharing before her assassination. Kayani was present when Musharraf
summoned the Chief Justice of Pakistan for an intimidative coercive session to sack him. General Kayani played his political trump card when he
managed to get Nawaz Sharif to call-off the million-man march to Islamabad seeking reinstatement of the Supreme Court Chief Justice.
As a Brigade Commander Kayani commanded the 111 Infantry Brigade at Rawalpindi, the formation which has been involved in all Pakistan Army
military coups. As a Corps Commander, Kayani commanded the Rawalpindi 10 Corps, the command of which goes only to those trusted by the
Pakistani political and military establishment.
The crowning political acumen of General Kayani surfaced when in the last three years he politically managed to sideline President Zardari in the apex
power game by playing off the PPP Prime Minister Gilani against President Zardari who also happens to be the President of the PPP.
General Kayani is certainly not in the mould of earlier Pak Army Chiefs like General Abdul Wahid Khakkar or General Jahangir Karamat who even today
are well respected in Pakistan with the former having refused an extension as Army Chief.
Pakistan Army Military Operations under General Kayani in Frontier Regions were Basically Genocidal in Nature
Much has been made of Pakistan Army’s success in military operations conducted in the frontier regions under General Kayani’s leadership as Army
Chief to quell the turbulence in Swat and South Waziristan etc. What is forgotten is that in these military operations the Pakistan Army shirked from
physically closing-in close combat with the tribal irregulars that faced them.
On the contrary, the Pakistan Army relied on genocidal use of disproportionate force against its own citizens by subjecting them to massive air strikes by
E-16 fighter planes, attack helicopters and artillery bombardments. In the process millions of Pakistani frontier citizens ended up as Internally
Displaced Persons.
Pakistan Army’s propensity to adopt genocidal military operations is well documented earlier in Bangladesh and Balochistan. Professionally, therefore,
General Kayani’s military successes, the basis for his extension, are dubious.
It also needs to be pointed out that General Kayani mounted these military operations only under intense US pressures. Either the Pakistan Army under
his command was reluctant to fight or General Kayani was double-timing the United States.
General Kayani’s Linkages With Al Qaeda. Taliban and Jihadi Terrorist Organizations
The Pakistan Army and the ISI operationally has had and continues to have linkages with the Al Qaeda, Taliban and Jihadi terrorist organizations. This
is a fact that is globally well documented and even the most ardent US supporters of Pakistan have now begun to concede.
It is inconceivable that General Kayani as Director General of Military Operations and more intensely as Director General of the notorious ISI had no
contacts with the upper echelons of these terrorist outfits and nor can he claim that he was unaware that he was ignorant of their terrorist attacks and
suicide bombings in India, especially.
General Kayani was DG ISI from 2004 to 2007 and can be held responsible for whatever mayhem the ISI conducted in India during this period.
General Kayani’s Extension: Foreign Policy Implications for India
General Kayani’s extension for three years causes complications for India’s foreign policy on Pakistan at two levels.
The first level is India’s own policy perspectives on Pakistan and the second level is the US pressures under which India will be subjected to on
Pakistan’s behalf in the next three years.
In this Author’s Papers on Pakistan it has been repeatedly being pointed that India’s Pakistan policy perspectives are flawed and further that India-
Pakistan peace is strategically not possible. The extension given to General Kayani under US prodding would further reinforce the Author’s assertions.
India has now publicly become well aware that the last Foreign Minister’s meeting in Islamabad was torpedoed by General Kayani’s unscheduled visit
to the Pakistani Prime Minister while the Indian Foreign Minister was made to wait to enable General Kayani’s call on his PM. After that event the Foreign
Ministers meeting went into a nose-dive.
With General Kayani in the driver’s seat in Pakistan on foreign policy with India, the Indian policy establishment should dispense with their rosy
expectations from Pakistan on dialogues. India’s peace with Pakistan apologists and those analysts advocating dialogue with the Pakistani military
establishment should dispense with their myopic lenses.
The Indian Prime Minister particularly has to reorient his thinking that India can grow and rise as a power of note despite lack of peace with Pakistan.
As for the second point India can expect to come under increasing United States pressures in the next three years to yield on Kashmir, water disputes
and Siachen ,which is General Kayani’s agenda for the United States, should they have to rely on him to pull out American chestnuts from Afghanistan’s
fires.
General Kayani’s Extension: Military Implications for India
General Kayani has not taken any pains to hide his animosity towards India when he publicly declared that Pakistan Army was and would continue to be
“India-Centric” and that on no account he would regroup or retrain Pakistan Army for Western frontier operations.
General Kayani within four months of taking over as Chief breached the four-year old ceasefire along the LOC in Kashmir. Thereafter there has been an
increase in border clashes, increased infiltration and whipping-up of turbulence in the Kashmir Valley through Pakistani-paid and patronized Kashmiri
separatists.
While the Indian Army has always combated these threats competently and blunted Pakistan Army’s nefarious activities the danger lies with India’s
political leaders who fritter away the gains made by the Indian Army and force them to fight with one hand tied politically because of political
compulsions. This would not do any further.
In the next three years greater synchronization would be needed between the Defense Ministry and the Home Ministry to meet enhanced threats with an
explosive politico-military mix.
Pakistan Army’s propensity to stoke armed conflicts when it does not make political headway also needs to be taken note of and India’s war-
preparedness has to be placed on a war-footing.
Concluding Observations
The Pakistan Army Chief, courtesy United States strategic compulsions in Afghanistan, has emerged not only as the ‘de facto’ ruler of Pakistan but also
as a pivotal character on which the United States has to rely for furtherance of its strategic interests in the region.
India accordingly faces twin challenges of recasting its Pakistan policy more based on strategic calculations and strong ripostes to Pakistan’s
disruptive activities against India, likely to escalate in the coming years. India also faces a more major challenge of how to manage the US-India
relations against a background where the United States can be expected to apply greater screws on India to accommodate General Kayani’s agenda
on Kashmir, water disputes and Siachen.
India would require to break-out of the egg-shell of being placed strategically at par with Pakistan as a co-equal, as a result of current United States
policies.
To meet these impending challenges, India’s political leadership will find itself cornered into a situation where the imperatives would call for Indian
“realpolitik policies” as a replacement for long-valued idealistic obsessions.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:
drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers40/paper3948.html
EXTENSION: IMPLICATIONS
By Dr Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
Pakistan Army Chief, General Kayani has been the focus of intense media discussions in the last week or so. Rightly so, because in Pakistan’s long
history this is the first time that a civilian democratic government in name has granted an unprecedented three year extension to General Kayani in
continuation of his due date of retirement in November 2010. The last time such a development took place was the extension given to General Ayub
Khan by President Iskandar Mirza, but then he was not an elected head.
While speculation has been on for a few months that General Kayani may be granted a year’s extension, later followed by speculation that it may be a
two-year extension, but nobody was prepared for Pakistani Prime Minister’s curt three minute announcement that a three year extension has been given
to General Kayani.
Obviously strong pressures have come into play and the question is whether such pressures were Pakistani domestic pressures or were they external
pressures that came strongly into effect. Undoubtedly, enough has figured in the media that the United States had indicated to the Pakistani
Government that it would like General Kayani to continue at the helm of the Pakistan Army.
Normally, such a development would have been ignored as the internal matter of Pakistan, but then one remembers the reality that General Kayani is
the ‘de facto’ ruler of Pakistan today and that he is driving Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India and Afghanistan and therefore makes it a subject of
regional and international analysis.
The signals emanating from such a development become more ominous when it is borne in mind that the United States is increasingly be seemed in
a ‘permissive mode” to let General Kayani lead United States by the nose in policy formulations on Afghanistan and India.
India must perceive General Kayani as a strong politico-military challenge for its policy formulations on Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States. In
well-calculated and well -calibrated moves he has placed Pakistan as the ‘PIVOT’ on which United States policy formulations in respect of all these
countries should revolve. Militarily he has reinvented Pakistan Army’s strategic utility to the United States and in the process invented his own
indispensability to the United States prompting it to pressure the Pakistan Government for a three year extension.
The implications for India’s national security become more complex with General Kayani with his “India-Centric’ hatred of India publicly articulated. India
at the time of General Kayani’s appointment as Pak Army Chief in 2007 was misled by US-fed assessments that he was a professional soldier and
therefore not prone to military adventurism against India. Such was the reliance on these assessment that India’s then National Security Adviser went
public to give a certificate to General Kayani.
Contextually therefore, for the benefit of the Indian policy establishment more pointedly, it is imperative that the chaff of Western ‘spins’ on General
Kayani are dispensed to the wind and an effort be made to unmask the real General Kayani by a deeper analysis of his professional record. The impact
of General Kayanis’ three years extension on India’s foreign policy and national security is touched in this Paper too.
As far as Pakistan is concerned it has to grapple seriously as to what impact this extension to General Kayani has on the overall question of civil-military
relations in Pakistan and the repercussions in the Pakistan Army officer cadre.
In unmasking the real General Kayani, this Paper would prefer to briefly dwell on the following aspects;
• General Kayani’s Appointment as Pakistan Army Chief and His Present Extension has the “Made in America” Stamp All-over
• General Kayani: A Political Chameleon Rather Than A Professional Soldier
• Pakistan Army’s Military Operations under General Kayani in Frontier Regions were Basically Genocidal in Nature.
• General Kayani’s Linkages With Al Qaeda, Taliban and Islamic Jihadi Terrorist Organizations
• General Kayani’s Extension: Foreign Policy Implications for India
• General Kayani’s Extension: Military Implications for India
General Kayani’s Appointment as Pakistan Army Chief and His Present Extension has the “Made in America”: Stamp All-over
A marked feature of United States involvement in the Pakistani scheme of things has been that they have always cultivated potential Pakistani Army
Chiefs and also as an insurance a second rung of Pakistan Army Generals as insurance cover if the preferred protégé turns out otherwise. However
such processes were subtly put into effect.
In the case of General Kayani, a beleaguered General Musharraf was pushed by the United States to name his DG ISI as the next Army Chief in 2007.
He was the United States preferred choice as following his appointment a ‘spin campaign’ was put in overdrive to project General Kayani as a thorough
professional, apolitical and inclined to let democracy take roots in Pakistan.
So heavily has the United States invested in the person of General Kayani that in March 2010 in the first ever US-Pak Strategic Dialogue the United
States made no secret that General Kayani was the ‘American Man’ in Islamabad and that he would be calling all shots . Media coverage of that time
amply highlights how much the United States policy establishment fawned over him in Washington. Equally in Islamabad, visiting US political
dignitaries made it a point to call on the Army Chief and pay their respects.
General Kayanis’ extension under US pressure was therefore a foregone conclusion, with only the quantum of extension being a major surprise.
While the simplistic deduction that is surfacing is that the United States would have extracted assurances that the Pak Army would facilitate a safe exit
for US Forces from Afghanistan, there is more yet to surface in terms what the Pakistani media calls a ‘Pak Army-US Deal”.
The ‘Made In America” stamp on General Kayani carries many serious implications for the General, in a country where ‘Anti-Americanism’ is at an all
time high. Pakistan seems to be divided deeply on the announcement of the three-year extension to General Kayani.
The respected Pakistani newspaper, The DAWN, in an Editorial, July 24, 2010 remarked:
• “Like it or not, the extension does not reflect well on the Army as an institution. It is almost an article of faith that the Pakistan Army is the only viable,
strong and vibrant institution in the country.
• Whatever General Kayani’s intimate familiarity with the present state of affairs and whatever the unique understanding of his of the situation, a
strong institution should be able to withstand the retirement of one man, however experienced.
• It is difficult to reconcile the idea of a strong institution having depth in talent and leadership with the “indispensability of a single man”
The same Editorial further pointedly asks if the United States could remove General McChrystal from Afghanistan at a critical juncture, Pakistan too
could have let General Kayani to go into retirement. Many former Pak Army retired officers opined that General Kayani should have refused the extension
offer.
General Kayani: A Political Chameleon Rather Than a Professional Soldier
Reflected on a Pakistani website was this description of General Kayani that he was recognized as a political chameleon. It quotes his long line of
political involvements in his service commencing with being Deputy Military Secretary to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and ending up with as a protégé
of General Musharraf whose personal animosity towards Bhutto was well known.
Kayani was Musharraf’s envoy to discussions with Bhutto in Dubai on power sharing before her assassination. Kayani was present when Musharraf
summoned the Chief Justice of Pakistan for an intimidative coercive session to sack him. General Kayani played his political trump card when he
managed to get Nawaz Sharif to call-off the million-man march to Islamabad seeking reinstatement of the Supreme Court Chief Justice.
As a Brigade Commander Kayani commanded the 111 Infantry Brigade at Rawalpindi, the formation which has been involved in all Pakistan Army
military coups. As a Corps Commander, Kayani commanded the Rawalpindi 10 Corps, the command of which goes only to those trusted by the
Pakistani political and military establishment.
The crowning political acumen of General Kayani surfaced when in the last three years he politically managed to sideline President Zardari in the apex
power game by playing off the PPP Prime Minister Gilani against President Zardari who also happens to be the President of the PPP.
General Kayani is certainly not in the mould of earlier Pak Army Chiefs like General Abdul Wahid Khakkar or General Jahangir Karamat who even today
are well respected in Pakistan with the former having refused an extension as Army Chief.
Pakistan Army Military Operations under General Kayani in Frontier Regions were Basically Genocidal in Nature
Much has been made of Pakistan Army’s success in military operations conducted in the frontier regions under General Kayani’s leadership as Army
Chief to quell the turbulence in Swat and South Waziristan etc. What is forgotten is that in these military operations the Pakistan Army shirked from
physically closing-in close combat with the tribal irregulars that faced them.
On the contrary, the Pakistan Army relied on genocidal use of disproportionate force against its own citizens by subjecting them to massive air strikes by
E-16 fighter planes, attack helicopters and artillery bombardments. In the process millions of Pakistani frontier citizens ended up as Internally
Displaced Persons.
Pakistan Army’s propensity to adopt genocidal military operations is well documented earlier in Bangladesh and Balochistan. Professionally, therefore,
General Kayani’s military successes, the basis for his extension, are dubious.
It also needs to be pointed out that General Kayani mounted these military operations only under intense US pressures. Either the Pakistan Army under
his command was reluctant to fight or General Kayani was double-timing the United States.
General Kayani’s Linkages With Al Qaeda. Taliban and Jihadi Terrorist Organizations
The Pakistan Army and the ISI operationally has had and continues to have linkages with the Al Qaeda, Taliban and Jihadi terrorist organizations. This
is a fact that is globally well documented and even the most ardent US supporters of Pakistan have now begun to concede.
It is inconceivable that General Kayani as Director General of Military Operations and more intensely as Director General of the notorious ISI had no
contacts with the upper echelons of these terrorist outfits and nor can he claim that he was unaware that he was ignorant of their terrorist attacks and
suicide bombings in India, especially.
General Kayani was DG ISI from 2004 to 2007 and can be held responsible for whatever mayhem the ISI conducted in India during this period.
General Kayani’s Extension: Foreign Policy Implications for India
General Kayani’s extension for three years causes complications for India’s foreign policy on Pakistan at two levels.
The first level is India’s own policy perspectives on Pakistan and the second level is the US pressures under which India will be subjected to on
Pakistan’s behalf in the next three years.
In this Author’s Papers on Pakistan it has been repeatedly being pointed that India’s Pakistan policy perspectives are flawed and further that India-
Pakistan peace is strategically not possible. The extension given to General Kayani under US prodding would further reinforce the Author’s assertions.
India has now publicly become well aware that the last Foreign Minister’s meeting in Islamabad was torpedoed by General Kayani’s unscheduled visit
to the Pakistani Prime Minister while the Indian Foreign Minister was made to wait to enable General Kayani’s call on his PM. After that event the Foreign
Ministers meeting went into a nose-dive.
With General Kayani in the driver’s seat in Pakistan on foreign policy with India, the Indian policy establishment should dispense with their rosy
expectations from Pakistan on dialogues. India’s peace with Pakistan apologists and those analysts advocating dialogue with the Pakistani military
establishment should dispense with their myopic lenses.
The Indian Prime Minister particularly has to reorient his thinking that India can grow and rise as a power of note despite lack of peace with Pakistan.
As for the second point India can expect to come under increasing United States pressures in the next three years to yield on Kashmir, water disputes
and Siachen ,which is General Kayani’s agenda for the United States, should they have to rely on him to pull out American chestnuts from Afghanistan’s
fires.
General Kayani’s Extension: Military Implications for India
General Kayani has not taken any pains to hide his animosity towards India when he publicly declared that Pakistan Army was and would continue to be
“India-Centric” and that on no account he would regroup or retrain Pakistan Army for Western frontier operations.
General Kayani within four months of taking over as Chief breached the four-year old ceasefire along the LOC in Kashmir. Thereafter there has been an
increase in border clashes, increased infiltration and whipping-up of turbulence in the Kashmir Valley through Pakistani-paid and patronized Kashmiri
separatists.
While the Indian Army has always combated these threats competently and blunted Pakistan Army’s nefarious activities the danger lies with India’s
political leaders who fritter away the gains made by the Indian Army and force them to fight with one hand tied politically because of political
compulsions. This would not do any further.
In the next three years greater synchronization would be needed between the Defense Ministry and the Home Ministry to meet enhanced threats with an
explosive politico-military mix.
Pakistan Army’s propensity to stoke armed conflicts when it does not make political headway also needs to be taken note of and India’s war-
preparedness has to be placed on a war-footing.
Concluding Observations
The Pakistan Army Chief, courtesy United States strategic compulsions in Afghanistan, has emerged not only as the ‘de facto’ ruler of Pakistan but also
as a pivotal character on which the United States has to rely for furtherance of its strategic interests in the region.
India accordingly faces twin challenges of recasting its Pakistan policy more based on strategic calculations and strong ripostes to Pakistan’s
disruptive activities against India, likely to escalate in the coming years. India also faces a more major challenge of how to manage the US-India
relations against a background where the United States can be expected to apply greater screws on India to accommodate General Kayani’s agenda
on Kashmir, water disputes and Siachen.
India would require to break-out of the egg-shell of being placed strategically at par with Pakistan as a co-equal, as a result of current United States
policies.
To meet these impending challenges, India’s political leadership will find itself cornered into a situation where the imperatives would call for Indian
“realpolitik policies” as a replacement for long-valued idealistic obsessions.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:
drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers40/paper3948.html
