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CIA’s Dangerous Liaisons
By Divya Kumar Soti
The Chapman incident calls for a shift to safer collaborations
Whenever CIA and any Arabian intelligence agency get too cozy, CIA station ends up getting bombed. History repeated itself when a Jordanian asset,
Human Khalil Abu Mulal al Balawi blew up himself at CIA’s forward operating base in Khost, Afghanistan on 30 Dec, 2009 killing at least 5 CIA people
and an officer of Jordanian intelligence agency, General Intelligence Department. The slain GID officer Sharif Ali Bin Zaid was a relative of Jordan’s King
and was Balawi’s direct handler at GID. Balawi was one of the many assets having links with Al-Qaeda’s Egyptian and Jordanian affiliates, recruited by
GID at CIA’s instance after 9/11. Such assets were deployed in Af-Pak after the discovery of direct working relationship between jehadi groups operating
from the region and extremists in Yemen and Jordan. Balawi was called to Khost station for a face to face meeting with CIA officers after he had told his
Jordanian handlers that he has some very valuable information about a high value target.
The incident underlines CIA’s unnecessary excitement for valuable HUMINT which sometimes results in violation of classic maxims of the game. The
direct meeting should not have been arranged at the station as Balawi was not a pure asset having a record of years of association with extremist
organizations. He had also acted as a moderator of a jehadi forum for years. Such forum activity has some particular effect out psychology as is evident
from so many cases and moreover he was doubled using compulsion. His reliability needed to be tested through times. Under conservative operating
standards, it would have been better to meet him at some third place. As they say, it is always better to get yourself bombed instead of getting your station
bombed.
What this incident brings to fore is how AQ & Affiliates are learning to beat the agencies pursuing them at their own game. As the western agencies have
limited ability when it comes to directly infiltrating these groups, they depend for HUMINT flow on intelligence agencies of various countries. Al-Qaeada &
affiliates are taking advantage of this and have deliberately provided these agencies with unstable assets. Jordan’s GID is one such intelligence agency.
After 9/11, when CIA searched for friends, it found most reliable and useful in GID. GID proved highly useful due to its vast reach inside Arabian terrorist
groups and an unlimited access made available to CIA. A CIA officer had told LA Times that he was able to roam inside GID HQ without any escort. After
Iraq invasion, Al-Qaeda operatives entered into intelligence games which were played in Iraq and Jordan. GID cultivated relationships with various
insurgent factions in Iraq including Zarqavi faction. Moles were nurtured and many believe that some such assets developed complications and there
were cases of reverse feeding if not handling. Such shadowy intelligence struggles contributed to instability that was witnessed in Iraq. In the meantime,
jehadi chains realigned and terrorists in Jordan and Yemen established deep linkages with homegrown terror groups in Af-Pak.
So the threads became inter-woven and intelligence agencies from Middle East started to set up shops in Afghanistan under extended cooperation with
CIA. What add to the utility of these agencies in Af-Pak are the convoluted equations of this region. There are basically three direct sources of HUMINT
about Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Haqqani Network, namely, Pak intelligence agencies, Indian intelligence agencies and some local groups in Pakistan.
Now, Pak intelligence agencies have lot of rogue elements particularly on field and middle ranks. ISI stations have recently become targets of bombings
as the reverse indoctrination is at play. Moreover, Islamabad’s selective treatment of terror groups and its reluctance to give up the policy of using these
groups for pushing its interests makes ISI an undependable partner. There have been incidents in Pak tribal areas, where news of arrival of Western
officers became known to public somehow and stones were pelted at his place. Off course he had to leave soon.
As far as Indians are concerned CIA do not collaborate much with them in Afghanistan keeping in consideration Islamabad’s sensitivities. Various local
groups in Pak like Baloch insurgents can be very useful when it comes to HUMINT flow from areas like Quetta. There are similar groups in Sindh. But CIA
maintains distance from these groups again due to Pak sensitivities.
Such high beta risk is going to persist in coming times. But some lessons need to be learnt. In an incident resembling Chapman one, a Hezbollah
suicide bomber blew up US embassy in 1986 in Beirut. The main cause of incident was the loose HUMINT dealings carried out by CIA people from the
embassy. So, you can not invoke a good terrorist out of a bad terrorist. This should be kept in mind while dealing with such assets. And off course other
options should be developed. The game is to be played and risk is worth taking but needs to be played unhurriedly with consistence.
(The author is an intelligence affairs analyst and may be reached at writing2divya@gmail.com)
>> http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2010/01/cias-dangerous-liaisons.html
By Divya Kumar Soti
The Chapman incident calls for a shift to safer collaborations
Whenever CIA and any Arabian intelligence agency get too cozy, CIA station ends up getting bombed. History repeated itself when a Jordanian asset,
Human Khalil Abu Mulal al Balawi blew up himself at CIA’s forward operating base in Khost, Afghanistan on 30 Dec, 2009 killing at least 5 CIA people
and an officer of Jordanian intelligence agency, General Intelligence Department. The slain GID officer Sharif Ali Bin Zaid was a relative of Jordan’s King
and was Balawi’s direct handler at GID. Balawi was one of the many assets having links with Al-Qaeda’s Egyptian and Jordanian affiliates, recruited by
GID at CIA’s instance after 9/11. Such assets were deployed in Af-Pak after the discovery of direct working relationship between jehadi groups operating
from the region and extremists in Yemen and Jordan. Balawi was called to Khost station for a face to face meeting with CIA officers after he had told his
Jordanian handlers that he has some very valuable information about a high value target.
The incident underlines CIA’s unnecessary excitement for valuable HUMINT which sometimes results in violation of classic maxims of the game. The
direct meeting should not have been arranged at the station as Balawi was not a pure asset having a record of years of association with extremist
organizations. He had also acted as a moderator of a jehadi forum for years. Such forum activity has some particular effect out psychology as is evident
from so many cases and moreover he was doubled using compulsion. His reliability needed to be tested through times. Under conservative operating
standards, it would have been better to meet him at some third place. As they say, it is always better to get yourself bombed instead of getting your station
bombed.
What this incident brings to fore is how AQ & Affiliates are learning to beat the agencies pursuing them at their own game. As the western agencies have
limited ability when it comes to directly infiltrating these groups, they depend for HUMINT flow on intelligence agencies of various countries. Al-Qaeada &
affiliates are taking advantage of this and have deliberately provided these agencies with unstable assets. Jordan’s GID is one such intelligence agency.
After 9/11, when CIA searched for friends, it found most reliable and useful in GID. GID proved highly useful due to its vast reach inside Arabian terrorist
groups and an unlimited access made available to CIA. A CIA officer had told LA Times that he was able to roam inside GID HQ without any escort. After
Iraq invasion, Al-Qaeda operatives entered into intelligence games which were played in Iraq and Jordan. GID cultivated relationships with various
insurgent factions in Iraq including Zarqavi faction. Moles were nurtured and many believe that some such assets developed complications and there
were cases of reverse feeding if not handling. Such shadowy intelligence struggles contributed to instability that was witnessed in Iraq. In the meantime,
jehadi chains realigned and terrorists in Jordan and Yemen established deep linkages with homegrown terror groups in Af-Pak.
So the threads became inter-woven and intelligence agencies from Middle East started to set up shops in Afghanistan under extended cooperation with
CIA. What add to the utility of these agencies in Af-Pak are the convoluted equations of this region. There are basically three direct sources of HUMINT
about Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Haqqani Network, namely, Pak intelligence agencies, Indian intelligence agencies and some local groups in Pakistan.
Now, Pak intelligence agencies have lot of rogue elements particularly on field and middle ranks. ISI stations have recently become targets of bombings
as the reverse indoctrination is at play. Moreover, Islamabad’s selective treatment of terror groups and its reluctance to give up the policy of using these
groups for pushing its interests makes ISI an undependable partner. There have been incidents in Pak tribal areas, where news of arrival of Western
officers became known to public somehow and stones were pelted at his place. Off course he had to leave soon.
As far as Indians are concerned CIA do not collaborate much with them in Afghanistan keeping in consideration Islamabad’s sensitivities. Various local
groups in Pak like Baloch insurgents can be very useful when it comes to HUMINT flow from areas like Quetta. There are similar groups in Sindh. But CIA
maintains distance from these groups again due to Pak sensitivities.
Such high beta risk is going to persist in coming times. But some lessons need to be learnt. In an incident resembling Chapman one, a Hezbollah
suicide bomber blew up US embassy in 1986 in Beirut. The main cause of incident was the loose HUMINT dealings carried out by CIA people from the
embassy. So, you can not invoke a good terrorist out of a bad terrorist. This should be kept in mind while dealing with such assets. And off course other
options should be developed. The game is to be played and risk is worth taking but needs to be played unhurriedly with consistence.
(The author is an intelligence affairs analyst and may be reached at writing2divya@gmail.com)
>> http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2010/01/cias-dangerous-liaisons.html