Baloch nationalists want to close China’s naval outpost on
the Indian Ocean
PRESS RELEASE:
Sunday, July 02, 2006
Indian and U.S. policy makers keen to support the Baloch resistance movement in Iran and Pakistan
KALAT, Balochistan -- After the tragic incident of September 2001 when Al Qaeda launched terrorist attacks within the
United States, the U.S. forces moved into Afghanistan and removed the Taliban regime, and warned the Pakistani
military dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf to cease its support of the Talibans. To appease the Americans, the
pragmatic General Musharraf immediately did an about-face and “appeared” to be with the U.S. forces, and portrayed
his government as an “ally in the war on terror”. But, in reality he never severed his ties with either the Al Qaeda or the
Talibans.

With its strategy of cooperation with the Americans, the Pakistani military regime
bought itself some time to fortify its position against future threats from U.S. Just
four months after the U.S.-led coalition forces liberated Afghanistan from the
Talibans, the Pakistanis courted China to counter U.S. hegemony in the region,
and broke ground with the Chinese in building a Deep Sea Port on the Arabian
Sea. The project was sited in an obscure fishing village of Gwadar in
Pakistani-occupied Balochistan, bordering Afghanistan to the northwest and Iran
to the southwest. Gwadar is nautically bounded by the Persian Gulf in the west
and the Gulf of Oman in the southwest.

Although the Gwadar Port project has been under study since May 2001, the U.S.
entrée into Kabul provided an added impetus for its speedy execution. Having
set up its bases in Central, South, and West Asian countries, the U.S. virtually
brought its military forces at the doorstep of China. Beijing was already wary of
the strong U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, which supplies 60% of its
energy needs. It was now alarmed to see the U.S. extend its reach into Asian
nations that ring western China. Having no blue water navy to speak of, China
feels defenseless in the Persian Gulf against any hostile action to choke off its
energy supplies. This vulnerability set Beijing scrambling for alternative safe
supply routes for its energy shipments. The planned Gwadar Deep Sea Port was
one such alternative for which China had flown its Vice Premier, Wu Bangguo, to Gwadar to lay its foundation on
March 22, 2002.
Pakistan was interested in the project to seek strategic depth further to the
southwest from its major naval base in Karachi that has long been vulnerable
to the dominant Indian Navy. In the past, it endured prolonged economic and
naval blockades imposed by the Indian Navy. To diversify the site of its naval
and commercial assets, Pakistan has already built a naval base at Ormara, the
Jinnah Naval Base, which has been in operation since June 2000. It can berth
about a dozen ships, submarines and similar harbor craft. The Gwadar port
project, however, is billed to crown the Pakistan Navy into a force that can rival
regional navies. The government of Pakistan has designated the port area as a
"sensitive defense zone." Once completed, the Gwadar port will rank among the world's largest deep-sea ports.
The convergence of Sino-Pakistani strategic interests has put the port project onto a fast track to its early completion.
In three years since its inauguration, the first phase of the project is already complete with three functioning berths.
Although the total cost of the project is estimated at $1.16 billion USD, China pitched in $198 million and Pakistan
$50 million to finance the first phase. China also has invested another $200 million into building a coastal highway
that will connect the Gwadar port with Karachi. The second phase, which will cost $526 million, will feature the
construction of 9 more berths and terminals and will also be financed by China. To connect western China with
Central Asia by land routes, Pakistan is working on building road links to Afghanistan from its border town of Chaman
in Balochistan to Qandahar in Afghanistan. In the northwest, it is building similar road links between Torkham in
Pakhtunkhaw (officially known as the Northwest Frontier Province) and Jalalabad in Afghanistan. Eventually, the
Gwadar port will be accessible for Chinese imports and exports through overland links that will stretch to and from
Karakoram Highway in Pakistan's Northern Areas that border China's Muslim-majority Autonomous Region of
Xinjiang. In addition, the port will be complemented with a modern air defense unit, a garrison, and a first-rate
international airport capable of handling large air transport service.
Pakistan already gives China most favored nation (MFN) status and is now
establishing a bilateral Free Trade Area (FTA), which will bring tariffs between
the two countries to zero. Over the past two years, the trade volume between the
two countries has jumped to $2.5 billion a year, accounting for 20% of China's
total trade with South Asia. Informal trade, a euphemism for smuggling,
however, is several times the formal trade. The proposed FTA is an implicit
acceptance of the unstoppable "informal" trade as a "formal" one. More
importantly, Chinese investment in Pakistan has increased to $4 billion,
registering a 30% increase just over the past two years since 2003. Chinese

companies make up 12% (60) of the foreign firms (500) operating in Pakistan, which employ over 3,000 Chinese
nationals.
The growing economic cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad is also solidifying their strategic partnership.
Before leaving for his visit to Beijing this past December, Pakistani Prime Minister Aziz told reporters in Islamabad:
"Pakistan and China are strategic partners and our relations span many areas." The rhetoric of strategic alignment is
duly matched by reality. Last year, China and Pakistan conducted their first-ever joint naval exercises near the
Shanghai coast. These exercises, among others, included simulation of an emergency rescue operation. Last
December, Pakistan opened a consulate in Shanghai. The Gwadar Port project is the summit of such partnership
that will bring the two countries closer in maritime defense as well.
Initially, China was reluctant to finance the Gwadar port project because Pakistan offered the U.S. exclusive access to
two of its critical airbases in Jacobabad (Sind) and Pasni (Balochisntan) during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.
According to a Times of India report on February 19, 2002, Gen. Musharraf had to do a lot of explaining for leasing
these bases to America. China, the Times of India reported, was also upset with Pakistan for allowing the U.S. to
establish listening posts in Pakistan's Northern Areas, which border Xinjiang and Tibet. When China finally agreed to
offer financial and technical assistance for the project, it asked for "sovereign guarantees" to use the Port facilities to
which Pakistan agreed, despite U.S. unease over it.
In particular, the port project set off alarm bells in India which already feels encircled by China from three sides:
Myanmar, Tibet, and Pakistan. To counter Sino-Pak collaboration, India has brought Afghanistan and Iran into an
economic and strategic alliance. Iranians are already working on Chabahar port in Sistan-Va-Baluchistan, which will
be accessible for Indian imports and exports with road links to Afghanistan and Central Asia. India is helping build a
200-kilometer road that will connect Chabahar with Afghanistan. Once completed, Indians will use this access road
to the port for their imports and exports to and from Central Asia. Presently, India is in urgent need of a shorter transit
route to quickly get its trade goods to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

The port, by design or by default, provides China a strategic foothold in the
Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. This Sino-Pakistani strategy has caused
major concerns in India and great unease for the U.S. sitting opposite the Strait
of Hurmoz, through which 80% of the world's energy exports flow. The Chinese
presence on the Indian Ocean will further increase its strategic influence with
major South Asian nations, particularly Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri
Lanka, which would prompt the Indians in turn to re-strengthen their Navy.
The port is intended to serve China's fourfold economic and military objective:
- To integrate Pakistan into the Chinese economy by outsourcing low-tech, labor-absorbing, resource-intensive industrial
production to Islamabad, which will transform Pakistan into a giant factory floor for China;
- To seek access to Central Asian markets for energy imports and Chinese exports by developing road networks and rail links
through Afghanistan and Pakistan into Central Asia;
- To appease restive parts of western China, especially the Muslim-majority autonomous region of Xinjiang, through a massive
infusion of development funds and increased economic links with the Central Asian Islamic nations of Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; and
- To monitor its energy shipments from the Persian Gulf, and offer it, in the case of any hostile interruption in such shipments, a
safer alternative passage for its energy imports from Central Asia.
These external concerns are stoking internal challenges to the port project. Balochistan, where the project is located, is once again up
in arms (for the fifth time in 58 years) against the Pakistani occupation forces. The most important reason for armed resistance against
the Gwadar port is that Baloch nationalists see it as an attempt to marginalize them politically, oppress then with military force, and
usurp their natural resources. Several insurgent groups have sprung up to nip the project in the bud and expell the Chinese from
Balochistan. The three most effective are: the Balochistan Liberation Army, Balochistan Liberation Front, and People's Liberation
Army. On May 3, 2004, BLA killed three Chinese engineers working on the port project that employs close to 500 Chinese nationals.
The realization of economic and strategic objectives of the Gwadar port by Pakistan is
largely dependent upon the reduction of separatist violence in Balochistan by the Baloch
freedom fighters. Pakistani response to secessionism is aggressive military action in
Balochistan. Pakistani fighter jets, gunship helicopters, heavy artillery, and over 60,000
troops have launched a military operation inside Balochistan to target the ethnic Baloch
population, mainly the non-combatant, innocent men, women and children. To date the
Pakistani forces have conducted extrajudicial arrests of more than 4,000 Baloch activists,
killed over 700 Baloch nationals in direct military action, and planted landmines in Baloch
areas to close all escape routes resulting in the deaths of over 10,000 Baloch civilians due
of starvation and lack of medical assistance.
Jerusalem, Israel based Government of Balochistan in Exile is in contact with officials of
countries that have a vested interest in containing Chinese ambitions in the region.

Negotiations are being conducted to explore ways and means to close the Chinese naval outpost in Gwadar. Both
the Indian and U.S. policy makers are keen to resolve the grievances of the Baloch people through peaceful means.
But, neither Iran, Pakistan nor China agree to retract from their plans and settle the issue of sovereignty of
Balochistan with the Baloch leadership. Hence, the Baloch nationalists were compelled to fight for their self-
determination, and they have already waged the “Baloch War of Independence” on both the Iranian and Pakistani
government forces.
Baloch News Bureau Report
Mir Azaad Khan Baloch
General Secretary
The Government of Balochistan in Exile
http://governmentofbalochistan.blogspot.com/
Baloch Society Of North America (BSO_NA) Baloch Society Of North America (BSO_NA) is Non-Profit Organization, working to unite and Organize all Baloch in North America, to expose the Occupation of our land (Balochistan) and exploitations of our resources by Pakistani and Iranian Governments, and to bring their Human Rights Violations in Balochistan into the world’s Notice.
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